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ABSTRACT 
The  test philosophy at the  GoddardSpace  Flight  Center  emphasizes 
system  testing of flight  spacecraft.  This  report  presents  data  from  the 
thermal-vacuum  tests of 11 flight  spacecraft. 
The  data show that  total  test  time is not as important as the  time 
required at four kinds of thermal stress levels. The data base was 
chosen  to  include  three  programs of differing  complexity and differing 
test emphasis, prior to the system test. The individual and collective 
data indicate a minimum  thermal-vacuum  system  test  time of 13 days 
regardless of the  prior  test  program.  The 13 days need to be distrib- 
uted as follows: 1, 4, 4, and 4 for ambient, transient, cold, and hot 
thermal-vacuum  environments,  respectively. 
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TIME REQUIRED FOR AN ADEQUATE THERMAL-VACUUM 
TEST OF FLIGHT MODEL SPACECRAFT 
by 
A. R. Timmins* 
Goddard  Space Flight Center 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the  cornerstones of test philosophy at the Goddard  Space  Flight  Center is the  system 
tests of the flight  spacecraft  under  environmental  stress.  Aside  from  the  required  tests on the 
flight  spacecraft,  there is considerable  variation among programs  in  the  amount,  severity, and 
kinds of testing. On the  basis of the particular  circumstances of his program,  the  project  manager 
decides i f  a prototype  spacecraft,  an  engineering  model  spacecraft,  or a thermal  model  spacecraft 
will be needed. He also  decides the amount of testing  to be done at the  subsystem  level and  the 
piece  part  level. Among his prerogatives  are  decisions on  the  use of many other  quality  assurance 
techniques,  such as burn-in of electronic  parts. 
One of the  required tests on a flight  spacecraft is conducted  under  simulated  space  conditions. 
With respect  to  this  test,  an  intriguing  question is, "How long  should the test  be  conducted in  order 
to  eliminate  infant  mortality  failures?"  References 1, 2, and 3 discuss  the "bathtub" curve  (see 
Figure 1) and the  infant  mortality  region of the  curve. While the  curve is useful  conceptually, it 
does not answer  such  questions as: (1) What test time is required to eliminate  infant  mortality 
failures? (2) Does each kind of stress  produce a distinctive  infant  mortality  result? (3) What is 
the  effect of prior  testing at the subsystem  level on the  system  test  time  requirement? 
To assess our  practice, a study was made 
of the  past  experience at Goddard Space Flight 
Center.  This  report  eviews  the  simulated 
space tests on the IMP, OGO, and  Nimbus  flight 
spacecraft.  These  programs have had different 
emphases on the amount of testing at the sys- 
tem, subsystem, and piece part level, and the 
effect of this variation is reviewed.  Another 
aspect included is the performance of the ex- 
periments  compared with the  balance of the 
*Test and  Evaluation  Division. 
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SPACECRAFT  LIFE 
Figure 1-Theoretical failure pattern. 
spacecraft. In general,  stringent  quality-control  activities  have  not  been  required of experi- 
menters;  therefore,  the  performance of their  hardware  in  the  simulated  space test of the  flight 
spacecraft  will  be  examined  separately. In addition to  discussing  these  interesting but subordinate 
points,  the  review is directed  to  the  principal  question: "How long  should a flight  spacecraft  be 
tested  in a simulated  space  environment? " 
LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
The  review  encompasses  the  results of the  thermal-vacuum tests conducted  on  selected  flight 
spacecraft.  Some of the  programs  also  included  solar  simulation tests, but those are not  included 
Table 1 
Roles of IMP  Prototype  Spacecraft. 
Program 
IMP-A 
IMP-B 
IMP-C 
AIMP-D 
AINIP-E 
IMP-F 
Note 
Prototype  spacecraft  was  launched 
Prototype  data  from IMP-A 
Prototype  data  from IMP-A 
Prototype and flight  spacecraft 
Prototype and flight  spacecraft 
Proto-flight  spacecraft  (one  spacecraft) 
~- 
here. A separate  study on such tests is in 
order. 
The  review  does  not  deal  with  the effect 
of a prototype  spacecraft on  the test results. 
For  the  record,  the OGO program had a 
prototype  observatory, but it  was  tested  in a 
thermal-vacuum  environment  after  the first 
flight  observatory  test. On the other hand, the 
prototype  Nimbus  spacecraft  was  tested  ex- 
tensively  before  the  flight  spacecraft  was 
tested. On the IMP program the role of a 
prototype  spacecraft is even more clouded, as 
shown by Table 1: 
The  effect, i f  any, of subsystems tests on 
system test performance will of necessity be judged  indirectly.  Records are not available of the 
number or   resul ts  of such  tests  for all of the  spacecraft  under  review. 
On the  other hand, there is the following  distinction  between  the  programs: 
1. IMP-Subsystem tests  were not mandatory, but were  performed on a selective  basis 
(Explorer-type  spacecraft (100 to 200 pounds)  with 9 to 11 experiments). 
2. OGO-Subsystem tests  required on prototype and flight hardware. Flight hardware 
subsystems  tested  for 1 day,  prototype  hardware  subsystems  tested  for  2  days 
in  thermal-vacuum  environment  (Observatory-type  spacecraft (1200-pound 
class) with 20 experiments). 
3. Nimbus-Most extensive  testing of any Goddard  program.  Subsystems  were  tested  for 
12  days. In addition, a sensory  ring (about 75 percent of the  spacecraft) 
thermal-vacuum  test  was conducted for  10  days  prior  to  the  test of the  com- 
plete  spacecraft.  The  spacecraft weighed 800 to 1300 pounds and included 
8 to 10  experiments. 
No method is available of satisfactorily  normalizing  the  effect of differing  complexity  on  the 
test results.  This,  together with the  use of differing  numbers of spacecraft  per  program,  precludes 
using  the  number of failures as a basis  for  comparison.  The  programs are compared by means of 
a technique  that  uses  failures  versus  time and  environment. 
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SOURCE OF DATA 
The  data  base  comprises  about 175 thermal-vacuum test days of flight  spacecraft,  distributed 
as shown in  Table 2. 
The IMP spacecraft  included A, B, C ,  D, E, and F (see  Table 1). The OGO spacecraft  were 
A, C, and D (OGO-B had  only a solar  simulation  test).  The  Nimbus  spacecraft  were  A  and C .  
(Nimbus B followed  Nimbus C . )  
The  data  were  obtained  from  the following sources: (1) test and  evaluation  (T&E)  support 
managers' box scores, (2) reports  from  T&E  project  engineers, (3) director's weekly reports, 
(4) official  contractors'  reports,  and (5) malfunction  reports. 
F-" 
IMP 
OGO 
NIMBUS 
TOTAL 
FAILURE DATA 
Table 2 
Data  Base. 
Number Of 
per  Spacecraft Spacecraft 
Test  Days 
6 94 16 
3 
20 41 2 
14 41 
11  176 16 
Average  Test  Days 
- 
U 
% 40 
9 20 
For each thermal-vacuum test of the flight 5 -20 2 0  
spacecraft a thermal  profile  versus  time  was 2 % ~ ~ " " " " "  
made. Each failure was indicated on the ther- I- 0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7  
mal profile, as shown by the example in Fig- 
ure  2. From the individual  thermal  profiles, 
summary  tables and graphs  (Tables 3, 4, and 5, 
and  Figures 3, 4, and 5) were  prepared. 
Each  failure  was  reviewed  to  verify its 
classification. A failure  was defined as having 
occurred when any item could not perform its 
function. In most cases the item was then re- 
moved from the spacecraft for rework or re- 
placement.  Available i n f o r m a t  i o n  on each 
failure  was  reviewed,  in  order  to  associate  the 
failure with the thermal environment causing 
the  failure. 
~ 
umber 
Item 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
~ 
~ 
~~ ~ 
Mcrlfunction 
Failure or 
F 
F 
F 
M 
M 
F 
F 
M 
M 
~ 
TEST DAYS 
Identification 
MIT Experiment 
Ion 8 electron experiment 
Optical aspect  computer 
Ion 8 electron experiment 
GSFC  magnetometer  experiment 
Attitude control system 
Performance parameter card 
Optical aspect m o n  time 
Iowa  experimen+ 
Figure 2-Typical thermal-vacuum test profile. 
3 
\, 
I I I  - 
The failures were then segregated into the following thermal categories: 
1. Ambient (25°C *5"C) 
2. Transient 
3. Cold (below 20°C) 
4. Hot (above 30°C) 
Table 3 
Distribution of Thermal-Vacuum  Failures  from 11 Flight  Spacecraft' 
by Environment  and  Test  Days. 
Test  Days * 
Environment ~~~~ ~ ~~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
- 
Ambient 
12 7 3 2 0 0 0 0 0  Hot 
33 2 0 9 1 3 0 0 0 0  Cold 
8 0 1 1 5 1 0 0  Transient 
9 9 0 0 0 0  
I Total I 62 
' 6  IMP, 3 OGO, and 2 Nimbus spacecraft. 
2Test   days are  not  consecutive. 
Failures 
Average/Spacecraft 
-~ I 
-- 1 
~ -~ 
0.8 
0.7 
3.0 
1.1 - ! 
5.6 
~ ~ - -  1 
Table 4 
Distribution of Thermal-Vacuum Failures from 11 Flight  Spacecraft3 
by Environment  Test  Program  and  Test  Days. 
Test  Days5 
Environment Spacecraft3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  
IMP 
2 0  OGO Ambient 
5 0  
" _;I_". 
Nimbus 2 0 0 0 0  
~ ~~ " ~ "~ 
IMP 0 0 0 3 0  
Transition 0 0 0  OGO 
Nimbus 
IMP 
Cold OGO 
Nimbus 
IMP 
Hot OGO 
Nimbus 
0 1 1 2 1 0 0  
.- 
' 6 3 1 0 0 0  
l z 4 6  0 2 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 1 0  
2 1 1 0 0 0  
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0  
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
- . . - 
- . . -
Total 
36 IMP, 3 OGO, and 2 Nimbus spacecraft. 
*Five  associated  with poor connections  and/or  connectors. 
'Test  days  are  not  consecutive. 
.~ = -~ 
Failures 
. - .  
- 1  
1.0 
1.0 
2 1.0 
3 0.5 
0 
5 2.5 
i: 1 6.7 1.7 
3 1.5 
4 0.7 
4 1.3 
4 2.0 
"_ 
.. . .
~~~~  I ~ 5.6 . ~~ 62 
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A failure  in any of these  environments  was  assumed  to  be  the  result of that  environment  alone, 
even if one of the other  environments  preceded it. For  instance, if a I-day test was conducted 
consisting of 1 day at each of the  above  listed  environments,  and a failure  occurred  on  day 3 (cold), 
it would be  classed as a 1-day  cold  failure. If the test lasted 8 days,  the  same  sequence as before 
but  with, the  sequence  repeated,  and a failure  occurred on the  seventh  day, it would be  classed as a 
2-day cold  failure. 
The  amount of bias  introduced by this treatment is not known. However,  the results show 
clearly  that  several  infant  mortality  periods  must be covered  in a simulated  space test. 
An additional  simplification  was  used  for  the  transient  failures. These failures  were  detected 
at a time when the  temperature of the  spacecraft  was being  changed from  one  level  to  another. 
Each  transient  was  assumed  to last 12  hours,  regardless of the  temperature  difference between 
levels and regardless of the  direction of the  temperature change. This  simplification, two tran- 
sients  per day, permitted  the  presentation of these  data  in the same  manner as the other  three 
thermal  environments. 
The  usefulness of failure  data is influenced by two conflicting  requirements. An insufficient 
amount  limits  confidence  in  summarized  results, and the  need for  recency  (especially so with fast- 
moving space technology) tends  to  limit  the amount of spacecraft data. To  maintain  the  usefulness 
of the data  from  the  present  study,  detailed  tables have  been  included  in  Appendix A in a form  that 
can be  used  to add to  the  amount of data or  to  substitute  recent  for  outmoded data. 
MALFUNCTION DATA 
A malfunction is defined as any performance  outside  the  specified  limits.  Thus,  the  malfunc- 
tion data  include all failures  and,  in  addition,  include  substandard  performance.  Examples of mal- 
functions which were not failures are: (1) volt- 
ages outside s p e c i f i c a t i o n  at one (or both) 
temperature  extremes; (2) e q u i p  m e n t non- 
operable at low temperatures though satisfactory 
on return  to  normal  temperature; (3) temporary 
shift in  modulation,  synchronization,  frequency, 
etc . 
FAILURES  VS 
> -  
-DAYS IN FAILURE 
3 
U 
- 
I I I ' I ' I  1 ' 1 ' 1 '  
10  12 14 16 18 20  2  24 
ENVIRONMENT I 
The  malfunction  data  were reviewed  in the TOTAL DAYS IN TEST 
same  manner as the failure  data,  and  similarly 
put  on  thermal  profile  plots.  From  the individ- 
ual  thermal  profiles,  summarized  graphs  (Fig- versus time  ande vironment. 
0 2 4 2 4 6 2 4 6 1 3 5 7  
DAYS IN FAlLlRE E N V I R O N M M  
Figure 3-Thermal-vacuum failures of flight spacecraft 
ures  6 and 7) were developed. The same as- 
sumptions  and  treatment of data  were  made with respect  to  time of occurrence of a malfunction 
and  environment of a malfunction as with the  failure data.  Some  detailed  malfunction  data are in- 
cluded  in Appendix A  in a form  that  can  be  used  to  increase the sample  size  or  to  substitute  recent 
for outmoded  data. 
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DISCUSSION OF FAILURE DATA 
Failures Versus Environments 
The  most  significant  feature of Figure 3 is related  to  the  infant  mortality  region of the "bath- 
tub" curve.  The  top  curve, FAILURES VS. TOTAL DAYS IN TEST, is in  time  sequence and 
would be  valid if the  cause of failure  was only time  in vacuum. This curve is not related  to  the 
four  thermal  environments shown. It was  constructed by summarizing all failures by the  day  on 
which they occurred, and plotting them cumulatively. The second curve, FAILURES VS. DAYS 
IN  FAILURE ENVIRONMENT, was  constructed by segregating  the  data  into  four  thermal  environ- 
ments,  and  plotting  failures  in  each  environment  in  time  sequence.  The  order of the  four  thermal 
environments  for  the bottom curve is arbitrary.  The  data show that  total  days  under a simulated 
space  environment  give a curve  distinctly  different  from  one  constructed  according  to  four  thermal 
environments  used  in  the tests. The  important  feature is that  each of the  four  thermal  environ- 
ments  appears  to have a time-dependent  plateau.  This  apparently  indicates  an  infant  mortality 
region  for  each of the  four  thermal  environments.  Extending this interpretation  leads one  to  ask 
if there  are  other  types of thermal  stress  that  may  exist  in  space but a r e  not covered  in  the  simu- 
lated  space test reported  on  here.  For  instance,  the  thermal-vacuum  test  data  reported  herein 
included no instances  where  energy  was  radiated  to one side of the  spacecraft while  the  other  side 
radiated to the  simulated  cold of space. Such stresses  can be simulated  (solar  simulation  test) 
but a r e  not part of the  present study. 
Comments  on  each of the  four  phases of the  thermal-vacuum  tests as shown in  Figure 3 follow 
below. 
1. Ambient  failures-Most of these  failures  were  detected  either  in  pretest  checkouts or in 
the early part of the test before  thermal conditioning was  started.  There is no need  indi- 
cated  for  additional  testing  in this environment.  However, a requirement  for a ful l  day of 
operation  in  this  environment is an  efficient way to eliminate  non-thermal-related  failures. 
2. Transient  failures-The  data  base  for  these  failures is considered  somewhat weak. This 
part  of a  test is not  normally  monitored as completely as those  parts when thermal  equilib- 
rium exists. In some  cases a complete  spacecraft  checkout is deferred  until  the new ther- 
mal  level is reached.  Despite  these  test and reporting  limitations,  the  data show that 
transient  temperature  failures  occurred after 2, 3, and 4 days of this  type of conditioning. 
3. Cold failures-The  data show that this  environment  contributed  about 55 percent of the 
total  failures. Some of the  first-day cold failures  may have  been caused by transient 
failures that  were not  detected  until a complete  checkout  after  thermal  stabilization.  Also, 
some of these  first-day  cold  failures would possibly  have  occurred i f  the hot phase had 
occurred  first.  Nevertheless,  these  uncertainties  are not sufficient  to  change  the  strong 
effect of this  environment.  Even i f  all the  first-day  cold  failures  were  discounted,  the  total 
number of cold  failures would still be greater than for any of the  other  environments. 
Figure 3 shows  that a minimum of 4 days is needed to  reach  the  plateau  in  this  environ- 
ment. These  results  agree with two previous  studies,  References 4 and 5, which pointed 
out  the  need for  adequate  cold  temperature  testing. 
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4. Hot failures-These  failures  average  about  one  per  flight  spacecraft. None of the  failures 
occurred after 3 days at this thermal  level, but the  number of spacecraft  under test should 
be  noted  (Table 5). Whereas all 11 spacecraft  were  tested  for 2 days,  only  seven of the 
spacecraft  were  tested  for  more  than 3 days. In other  words, the curve  should  be  regarded 
as a minimum  with  respect  to the time  necessary  to  reach  the  plateau. 
Table 5 
Number of Spacecraft per Test  Day. 
~~~ 
Snvironment 
Ambient 
Transition 
Cold 
Hot 
TOTAL 
Spacecraft: 
IMP 
OGO 
Nimbus 
IMP 
OGO 
Nimbus 
IMP 
OGO 
Nimbus 
IMP 
OGO 
Nimbus 
. .. . 
Test  Days6 
~~ ~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  
6 0  
3 1 0  
2 2 1 1 1 0  
6 6 6 6 3 1 0  
3 3 2 0  
2 2 2 2 2 1 1  
6 6 6 5 5 1 0  
3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 0  
2 2 2 2 1 0  
.. - 
~ ~ ~~ 
6 6 6 4 4 3 2 0  
3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 0  
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0  
~ ~~ ~~ 
Total 
Tes t  
Days 
6 
4 
7 
28 
8 
12 
29 
16 
9 
31 
13 
13 
176 
'For example: Both Nimbus spacecraft were tested under transient thermal conditioning for 5 
' 6  IMP, 3 OGO, and 2 Nimbus spacecraft. 
days (not consecutive). One of the two was tested for 7 days.  
Failures Per Program 
The three programs  under  study are quite  different  with  respect  to  weight,  complexity, num- 
ber of piece  parts and subsystems, and funding. Attempts  to  normalize these factors  were  unsatis- 
factory and demonstrated  that  meaningful  comparisons  could not  be made  on  the  basis of the 
number of failures. However, it was  desired  to know the  effect of the  amount of subsystem  testing 
before the test of the  complete  spacecraft.  (Table 6 shows  the  differences  between the three  pro- 
grams with respect  to test requirements.) One premise which was not based on the total  number 
of failures but should  be  useful  in  comparing the programs is as follows: If the  three  programs 
had differing  effectiveness  in  eliminating  infant  mortality  failures  prior  to  the  thermal-vacuum 
test  of the flight  spacecraft,  then the time  taken  to  reach a plateau  in the four  thermal  phases of the 
system test should  be  different.  Figure 4 illustrates this kind of comparison;  the  following  com- 
ments are applicable: 
7 
Table 6 
Piece Parts and Subsystems Test Requirements. 
1. 
Environment 
IMP-A 
-B 
-C 
-D 
-E 
-F 
O W - A  
-C 
-D 
Nimbus-A 
-C 
T Required Subsystem 
Experiments 
N o  
I 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
Y e s  
Yes 
3StS 
Other 
T 
No 
1 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
'Required 1000-hour bake or 300-hour burn-in. 
9 ~ o n u a c t o r  l i s t .  
Required 
Burn-In of Pi 
Experiments 
No 
1 
No 
No 
No 
No' 
No8 
e  Parts 
Other 
No 
1 
No 
No 
Yes 
No8 
No' 
Required 
Preferred 
Experiments 
No 
T 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
wts 
Other 
No 
v 
Yes 
Yes 
yesg 
No 
No 
IMP program-Figure 4 summarizes  data  for all six IMP spacecraft. A plateau  was  reached 
in 3 days  or less for  the  ambient, cold,  and  hot  phases.  The  only  transient  failures  occurred 
between six and  eight  transients (two transients  per day). As  discussed  before,  there may 
be a few  failures  in  the  other  phases which  should  be  in  the  transient  phase.  The  sum- 
marized  data  in  Figure 4 indfcate  that  adequate test t imes have  been  used  for  the  thermal- 
vacuum tests of the  flight  spacecraft.  Several  cautions  need  mention  in  the use of these 
composite  data. (1) All spacecraft  were not tested  for  the  same  length of time;  Table 3 
shows  the  number of spacecraft  per  test day per  phase. (2) Figure 4 summarizes only the 
failures.  A  summary of total  malfunctions  (failures  plus  undesired  limitations) is presented 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
0 2 4 2 4 6 2 4 6 1 3 5 7  
DAYS IN FAILURE ENVIRONMENT 
- 6  IMP'S x + - U 3  OGO'S m 2 NIMBUS 
Figure 4-Thermal-vacuum failures of flight Spacecraft 
by environment,  program,  and  time. 
in  Figure 7. (3) The  summarized  data do not 
take  into  account  learning  curve  improvement. 
IMP B had two failures and IMP C no failures 
while IMP D had seven  failures.  This  trend 
agrees with  the IMP learning  curve  where  the 
B and C spacecraft  were  very  similar  to  the A 
spacecraft, but IMP D underwent major  design, 
mission,  and  hardware  changes. 
2. OGO program-The  summarized  data  for 
OGO-A, -C, and -D are shown in  Figure 4. 
Plateaus  for  the  ambient, cold,  and hot phases 
were  reached  in 1, 4, and 3 days,  respectively. 
The  results  for  the  transient  phase show no 
8 
failures at all. How many  may  have  occurred  in  this  phase but were  reported  in a different 
phase is not known. The  integrated  System  Test  for  this  observatory  takes about 8 hours 
to  complete, SO considerable  leeway exists in  the  time when a failure is first detected. 
3. Nimbus  program-Figure 4 shows  the  summarized  data  for Nimbus A and C. Plateaus  for 
the  ambient,  cold,  and  hot  phases  were  reached  in 1, 4, and 2 days,  respectively.  The  data 
for  the  transient  phase show failures  occurring up to and  including 10 transients  (equivalent 
to 5 days of this  type of conditioning). The  reason  that this environment  appears  more 
significant fo r  this program is attributed  to  more  exposure  to  testing of this kind  (Table 5) 
and  excellent  documentation. While transients have  always  been a part  of the  thermal- 
vacuum test, these  data  suggest  that  additional  emphasis  may  be  fruitful.  The  data do not 
demonstrate a superiority of one  program  over  the  others when the  "time  to  plateau" 
criterion is used. If a program  utilizing a philosophy of maximum testing prior  to  inte- 
gration had  shown a superiority  in  the "time to  plateau"  criterion,  then a benefit  could  be 
inferred. However, the  opposite  interpretation-subsystem  testing  does  not  affect  system 
test results-is not warranted. .What the results would have  been if no subsystems tests 
had been  made on all the  programs is not known. The  conclusion that can be  made is that 
a simulated  space  test on  the  flight  spacecraft  was  needed  for all three  programs. 
Experiments Versus Other Subsystems 
Figure 5 presents  summarized  failure  data 
on 11 flight  spacecraft on this  subject.  The  data 
show no significant  difference  in  the  number o r  
occurrence of failures between  the  experiments 
and other subsystems. The observation is valid 3 
for  each of the  four e n v i r o n m e n t a l  phases 0 2 4 2 4 6 2 4 4 1 3 5 7  
shown. The  data show a slightly  different re- DAYS IN FAILURE ENVIRONMENT 
suit when examined by program. shows Figure 5-Comparison of experiment  failures  with  otal 
a detailedcomparisonby spacecraft and by pro- failures  in  thermal-vacuum  tests of flight  spacecraft. 
gram. The percentages of failures ascribed to 
experiments  were 64,  54, and 14 percent,  respectively,  for the IMP, OGO, and  Nimbus programs. 
It has  been said that experiments  cause  most of the problems  encountered  during  the  test  phase of 
a program.  The  data show this to  be  true on individual  spacecraft, but  not in  general. 
DISCUSSION OF MALFUNCTION DATA 
The  data  discussed  thus far have  dealt only  with failures,  that is, difficulties  serious enough 
to  preclude  satisfactory  operation  in  space.  Generally,  the  items  were  repaired  or  replaced be- 
fore flight.  In  addition to  the  failures,  there  were  other  instances of unsatisfactory  performance: 
intermittent  operation,  equipment  outside  tolerance,  inoperable though  undamaged at temperature 
extremes,  temporarily out of synchronization, etc. If our  objective is to  detect and correct these 
malfunctions  in  addition  to  the  failures,  testing  may take longer  than it does  for  failures alone. 
Such  data  have  been  accumulated  and  summarized  in the same  manner as the  failure data. The 
9 
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Table 7 
Comparison of Experiments  with  Other  Subsystem  Failures  and  Malfunctions. 
Spacecraft 
IMP-A 
IMP-B 
IMP-c 
IMP-D 
IMP-E 
IMP-F 
Subtotal 
OGO-A 
OGO-c 
OGO-D 
Subtotal 
Nimbus I 
Nimbus II 
Subtotal 
Grand  Total 
Grand  Total in % 
Failures 
Experiments 
3 
2 
0 
3 
2 
4 
14 
3 
9 
2 
14 
0 
2 
2 
30 
48 
Other 
Subsystems 
1 
0 
0 
4 
3 
0 
8 
4 
6 
2 
12 
6 
6 
12 
32 
52 
I Malfunctions lo 
Experiments 
11 
6 
2 
9 
5 
8 
41 
5 
11 
5 
21 
1 
8 
9 
71 
55 
Other 
Subsystems 
2 
2 
4 
6 
4 
4 
22 
6 
10 
9 
25 
9 
3 
12 
59 
45 
Failures 
4 
2 
0 
7 
5 
4 
22 
7 
15 
4 
26 
6 
8 
14 
62 
48 
Totals 
Malfunctions 
13 
8 
6 
15 
9 
12 
63 
11 
21 
14 
46 
10 
11 
21 
130 
100 
"Failures plus other anomalies (out-of-specification, out-of-tolerance, intermirrents, etc.). 
data  to be discussed are identified as malfunction  data.  The  data  include all the  failure  data  dis- 
cussed  previously, but also  include all the other  discrepancies  that  affect  the  spacecraft  perform- 
ance.  The  summarized  data  are  displayed  graphically  in  Figures 6 and 7. In general,  the  same 
trends are evident  for  the  malfunction  data as have already  been  discussed  for  the  failure data. 
Specific  comments  on  the  malfunction  data follow: 
Malfunctions Versus Environments 
For  the four  thermal  environments  (ambient,  transient,  cold,  and hot), the  minimum  time  to 
reach a plateau is 1, 4, 4, and 4 days,  respectively.  Figure 6 shows  the  four  environments  in 
descending order of severity  to be  cold,  hot,  transient,  and  ambient. 
The  transient  data  again  indicate  (Figures 6 and 7) that  additional  time  in  this  environment 
may  be  fruitful. 
Exceptions  to  the  general  trend  were  the OGO performance  in  the  transient  environment, and 
Nimbus in  the  hot  environment.  The  Nimbus  plateau  was  reached  in 2 days  whereas  the  other 
10 
MALFUNCTIONS VS 
DAYS IN MALFUNCTION 
0 2 4 6 8 10  214 6 18 20  22  4 
TOTAL DAYS IN TEST 
0 2 4 2 4 6 2 4 6 1 3 5 7  ~ ~~ 
DAYS IN MALFUNCTION E N V I R O N M M  DAYS IN MALFUNCTION ENVIRONMENT 
-6 IMP'S N " K 3  OGO'S CC. 2 NIMBUS 
Figure 6-Thermal-vacuum malfunctions of  flight 
spacecraft versus time and environment. Figure 7-Thermal-vacuum malfunctions of  flight 
spacecraft by environment,  time,  and program. 
programs took from 4 to 6 days.  Only  one  malfunction was reported  for OGO in the transient 
phase,  whereas  the  other  programs  reported  transient  malfunctions up to 5 days. 
Malfunctions Versus Programs 
The  programs show a remarkable  similarity  in  the  time  to  reach a plateau  in  each  environ- 
ment.  The data (Figure 7) indicate,  that  the  Nimbus  program  has the best  demonstration  (longest 
time at the  plateau) of eliminating the infant  mortality  malfunctions  in the hot  environment.  The 
three  programs have almost  equivalent  performance  in the cold  environment,  and the time at a 
plateau is not nearly as convincing as the  plateau  time  in  the hot environment.  The  data  suggest a 
minimum of 3 days without  malfunction for  each  thermal  environment as a reasonable  demonstra- 
tion that infant mortality  malfunctions  have  been  eliminated.  The OGO and IMP programs show 
equivalent  performance  (except  for the transient  phase)  despite a significant  difference  in  the  sub- 
system test requirements  (Table 6). Probably  the  most  important point with respect to  malfunctions 
versus  programs is that  systems  tests of flight  spacecraft  are  necessary  regardless of the amount 
of testing that has been  done  previously. 
Experiments Versus Other Subsystems 
Figure 8 and Table 7 show that on a sum- 
mary  basis  experiments have  not  been very 
different from other subsystems with respect 
to occurrence of malfunctions. The IMP expe- 
rience is somewhat  different  from the total  ex- 
perience in that about 64 percent of the IMP 
malfunctions  were  ascribed  to experiments. 
However,  examination of the six IMP  space- 
craft data shows that experiment performance 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
'0 1-7-  2 4 6 2 A 6 2 4 6 
DAYS IN MALFUNCTION E N V I R O N M M  
Figure 8-Comparison of experiment  malfunctions with 
total malfunctions in thermal-vacuum tests of  flight 
spacecraft. 
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was as good as other  -subsystems  in  three of the spacecraft. The  Nimbus data are also different 
from  the  total  experience  in that only 30 percent of their malfunctions  were  ascribed to  experiment- 
type hardware  (cameras,  radiometers, etc.). 
The data do  not  support the opinion that experiments  always  cause  more  malfunctions  than 
other  subsystems.  However,  with  respect  to a specific  program,  experiments did account for  the 
majority of the malfunctions. A project  manager  may  anticipate  trouble with an  experiment  for 
various  reasons,  such as: complexity, state-of-the-art hardware, or past performance. Despite 
his best efforts  the real world of schedules,  hardware,  and  people  prevent  the  elimination of all 
malfunctions  before the systems test on the  flight  spacecraft. 
RECOMMENDED THERMAL-VACUUM PROFILE 
Figure 9 gives the minimum  requirements  for  an  adequate  thermal-vacuum  test of a flight 
spacecraft-based on experience  gained  from  the  present study. An additional  minimum  require- 
ment  should be that at least 24 hours of 'trouble- 
free operation be demonstrated at the end of 
each of the  four  thermal-vacuum  environments. 
The  recommended  profile  can be varied  to 
meet  specific  program  needs.  For  instance,  the 
test  can be started with a hot cycle when this is 
advantageous. The hot cycle at the end of the 
profile is recommended to minimize contami- 
nation of the spacecraft. (With this procedure 
the  thermal-vacuum  chamber  wall is a cold sink 
when the hot spacecraft is returned  to  ambient 
temperature.) 
CONCLUSIONS 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1  12 13 1 4 1 5  
TEST DAYS 
To ROOM TEMPERATURE. 
T i  MAXIMUM PREDICTED  SPACE  TEMPERATURE. 
T2 MINIMUM PREDICTED  SPACE  TEMPERATURE. 
Figure 9-Recommended thermal-vacuum profile for 
flight spacecraft. 
The  data  for  this  study  was  from  the  thermal-vacuum tests of flight  spacecraft, and  the con- 
clusions  are  applicable  to  the data base. 
A thermal-vacuum test of flight  spacecraft is necessary  regardless of the  previous  piece 
part  and subsystem  test  requirements. 
Infant mortality  curves  are  related  to both time and  kind of stress. 
At least three  kinds of thermal stress need to be applied for  sufficient  time  to  eliminate 
infant  mortality  failures. 
The  minimum  time  recommended  for the ambient,  transient,  cold, and  hot environments 
is 1, 4, 4, and 4 days, respectively. 
12 
The  minimum  time  (in  each  thermal  environment)  required  to  eliminate  infant  mortality 
failures  in  flight  spacecraft is not related  to  the amount of piece  part and subsystem tests 
required. 
On an  overall  basis  the  performance of experiments  has been as good as other  spacecraft 
subsystems. 
Goddard Space  Flight  Center 
National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration 
Greenbelt, Maryland, July 1968 
124-12-03-01-51 
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OGO-C 
OGO-D 
- 
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Nimbus TI 
Appendix A 
Detailed Tables on Failures and Malfunctions 
Table A-1 
Thermal-Vacuum System  Test  Failures on Flight  Spacecraft. 
A 
T 
C 
H 
A 
T 
C 
H 
A 
T 
C 
H 
A 
T 
C 
H 
A 
T 
C 
H 
A 
T 
C 
H 
A 
T 
C 
H 
A 
T 
C 
H 
A 
T 
C 
H 
A 
T 
C 
H 
A 
T 
C 
H 
- 
__ 
-~ ~ "~ ~ .~ 
___"___ . Days 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  
0" 
0 0 0 0 -  
1 0 0 0 0 ~  
1 1 1 0 0 0 "  
0" 
0 0 0 0 "  
0 0 0" 
0" 
0 0 0 0 0 "  
0 0 0" 
0 0 0"  
0" 
0 0 0 T8 0-  
3 2 1 0 0 0 "  
0 0 0 0 0 -  
3- 
0 0 0 0 -  
1 1 0 0 0 -  
0 0 0 0 0 0 "  
2 "  
0 0 0 0 0 "  
1 0 0 0 0 "  
1 0 0 0 0 +  
2 0- 
0 0- 
2 2 0' 
0 1" 
0 "  
0 0 0- 
9* 3 0 2 0" 
0 0 1 -  
0- 
0 0 0- 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 "  
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -  
2 0- 
0 T4 2 T 8 c  
1 0  0 0 -  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 "  
0 0 0 0 0 "  
0 0 1T6 0 1T" 0 0 + 
1 0 0 1 0 -  
~ ~ . .  - ___I 
- . .. 
." ~~ ~- 
o o o 2 ~ 7 "  
~~ 
." ~ 
_______ 
~ ~~ 
" - ~~ ~ ~"___ 
" 
ho 
*Five of these  were 
( 3  1 0 0 0- 
~" -. ~ 
t, T = transient, A = ambient; -. = duration of phase; 2T7 = I 
Totals 
Spacecraft 
0 
0 
1 
3 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
6 
0 
3 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
1 
1 
2 
0 
4 
1 
0 
0 
14 
1 
0 
0 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
0 
0 
2 
2 
4 
Program 
5 
3 
10 
4 
2 
0 
20 
4 
2 
5 
3 
4 
~ 
two failures on seventh transient. 
related to a connection  problem. 
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Table A-2 
Spacecraft 
IMP-A 
IMP-B 
IMP-C 
IMP-D 
IMP-E 
IMP-F 
O W - A  
OGO-C 
OGO-D 
Nimbus I 
Nimbus I1 1 
Thermal-Vacuum Test Malfunctions on Flight  Spacecraft. 
I 
1" 
1 
3 
8 
0" 
1 0 1 1 0 "  
1 0 0 -  
0" 
o o o o o *  
2 3 0" 
0 1 0" 
T' 0 0 3T7* ~4 
0 
3 
1 
0 
0 
5 
1 
A 0" 0 
T T' 0 0 T8 O* 2 
C 5 4 2 0 0 1 -  12 
H 1 0 0 0 0 -  1 
A 3- 3 
T T' 0 0 0 -  1 
C 2 3 0 0 0 -  5 
H 0 0 0 0 0 0 -  0 
A 4" 4 
T o o o o o +  0 
C 3 0 1 0 0 "  4 
H 2 1 1 0 0 "  4 
A 2 0" 2 
T 0 0 -  0 
C 4 3 0 -  7 
H 1 1- 2 
A 0 -  
T 0 0 0 -  
C 9 4 0 4 1 -  
H 0 2 1- 
0 
0 
18 
3 
A 0 -  0 
T 0 0 T5+ 1 
C 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 *  6 
H 4 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 +  7 
A 3 0 -  3 
T 2TZ  T4 0 2T8+ 5 
C 1 1  0 0 -  1 
H 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 "  1 
A o o o o o +  
C 1 1 0 2 0 "  
H 3 1 0 0 0 ~  
T 0 0 2T6 0 T'O 0 O* 
0 
3 
4 
4 
Totals 
Program 
8 
8 
32 
15 
d 
Grand 
I 
7" 
3 
32 5 
68 5 
17 8 
13 
1 
L 
C = Cold T = Transient + = Duration of phase H = Hot A = Ambient 2T7 = Two malfunctions  on  seventh  transient 
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Table A-3 
Summary of Thermal-Vacuum  Malfunctions of Flight  Spacecraft.*' I 
A. Distribution of Malfunctions by Environment  and  Test  Days. 
Environment 
Ambient 
Transient 
Cold 
Hot 
Test  Days 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  
~ Total 
~ ~~ ~~~ 
1 3 0 0 0 0  
32 1 4 9 4 2 1 0 1 1  
68 3 5 2 0  4 7 1 1  0 0 
17 5 2 3 6 1 0 0  
13 
130 
Average/ 
Spacecraft 
1.2 
1.5 
6.2 
2.9 
11.8 
B. Distribution of Malfunctions by Environment,  Test  Days, and Program. 
~~ 
Environment Spacecraft 
IMP 
Ambient OGO 
Nimbus 
Nimbus 
OGO Transient 
IMP 
Hot -IT Nimbus 
Nimbus 
OGO Cold 
IMP 
~ . ~ .  . ~ 
~ -. -. -. . - 
.~ 
~" ". . 
- .. 
Test  Days 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  
8 0  
2 0  
3 0 0 0 0  
3 1 0 4 0  
0 0 1  
2 1 2 2 1 0 0  
. . - - "_ 
~ 
1 5 1 1  4 1 0  1 
1 8 8 0 4 1 0 0 0  
2 1 0 2 0  
6 4 3 2 0 0  
5 3 1 0 1 0 1 1  
3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0  
. . ~" -~ 
I 
C. Distribution of Malfunctions by Program. 
Program Total 
Average/ 
Spacecraft 
10.5 
15.3 1 
10.5 
I Total I 130 I 11.8 1 
Total 
8 
2 
3 
8 
1 
8 
32 
31 
5 
15 
12 
5 
130 
Average/ 
Spacecraft 
1.3 
0.7 
1.5 
1.3 
0.3 
4.0 
5.3 
10.3 
2.5 
2.5 
4.0 
2.5 
11.8 
" 6  IMP, 3 OGO, and 2 Nimbus spacecraft. 
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Table A-4 
Summary of Experiment  Malfunctions in Thermal-Vacuum  Tests of Flight  Spacecraft.' 
A. Distribution of Malfunctions by Environment  and  Test  Days. 
Environment Test  Days Totals  Average Per 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  Spacecraft 
~~ 
Ambient 
1 2 3 3 2 0 0 0 0  Hot 
2 4 8 3 2 0 0 0 0  Cold 
3 0 2 2 0 0 0 Transient 
7 0 0 0 0  7 
1.8 20 
3.4 37 
0.6 7 
0.6 
1 Totals I 71 I 6.5 
B. Distribution of Malfunctions by Environment,  Test  Days, and Program. 
Test Days 
Program* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  I 
IMP 
1 1 0 0 0 0 Nimbus 
1 1 0  OGO 
5 5 0  
IMP 3 0 0 2 0  5 
OGO 0 0 0  
2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 Nimbus 
0 
INP 1 2 4 2 0 0 0  18 
OGO 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 0  16 
Nimbus 1 1 0 1 0 3 
IMP 6 3 2 2 0 0  13 
OGO 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0  5 
Nimbus 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
I 7 1  
" 
- 
Environment 
Ambient 
Transient 
Cold 
Hot 
Totals 
"G IMP, 3 OGO, and 2 Nimbus spacecraft. 
Average  Pe 
Spacecraft - 
1.0 
0.3 
0.5 
0.8 
0.0 
1.0 
3.0 
5.3 
1.5 
1.2 
1.7 
1.0 
6.5 
J 
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Table A-5 
Summary of Experiment  Failures in Thermal-Vacuum Tes ts  of Flight  Spacecraft! 
A. Distribution of Experiment  Failures by Environment  and  Test  Days. 
Test Eays 
Environment Average Per Totals 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  Spacecraft 
Ambient 
17 1 4 2 0 1 0 0 0 0  Cold 
0.3 3 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 Transient 
0.4 4 4 0 0 0 0  
3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0  
1.5 
IIot G 0.5 
Totals 30 2.7 
B. Distribution of Experiment  Failures by Environment, Test Days  and  Program. 
Environment  Program* 
Test Days 
Totals Average Per 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  Spacecraft 
IMP 
0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0  Nimbus 
0.0 0 0 0  OGO Ambient 
0.7 4 4 0  
IMP 0 0 0 2 0  
Nimbus 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  
' Transient I OGO 1 0 0 0  I i I :E 0.3 
0 0 0 0 0  0.7 
1 0 * 2  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nimbus 0 0 0 1 0  
IMP 2 1 1 0 0 0  
0.0 0 Nimbus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0.7 2 Hot OGO 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0  
0 .7 4 
Totals 30 2.7 
* F i v e  from onc iailurc.  
' ? 6  IMP, 3 OGO. and 2 Nimbus spncccraft. 
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